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CAPITALIZING THE TARGET'S TRANSACTION COSTS
IN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
David J. Roberts
Abstract: In A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that costs a corporation incurred to resist a hostile takeover were
analogous to costs incurred to defend a business against attack and thus qualified as ordinary
and necessary business expenses deductible under Internal Revenue Code section 162.
Alternatively, the court held that those costs associated with abandoned capital transactions
qualified for loss deductions under section 165. This Note argues that although the court
reached approximately the right result in this case, its primary reliance on a defense of
business rationale for deductibility under section 162 was erroneous and misguided. The Note
further argues that the distinction between hostile and friendly acquisitions is irrelevant to the
uniform and objective application of the Tax Code, and that the successful consummation of
any acquisition, regardless of how it is subjectively characterized, always constitutes a
corporate restructuring necessitating the capitalization of proximately related costs under
I.LRC. § 263. Finally, this Note concludes that although the court failed to fully address its
proper application, the authorization of a loss deduction under section 165 focuses upon more
salient facts than the distinction between friendly and hostile acquisitions and should be the
primary avenue for any deductions in such transactions. By more accurately accounting for
the real economics of the so-called hostile takeover, this proposed approach better protects the
Tax Code's underlying goal of matching income and expenses.
After a brief respite from the breathtaking pace of merger and
acquisition (M&A) deals in the 1980s, deal making has again accelerated
in recent years, with the latest wave of transactions proving bigger and
more complex than anything that came before.' This complexity provides
a fertile breeding ground for some of the most exorbitant fees in the legal
and banking communities. In reference to one recent transaction, the
largest takeover in U.S. history, commentators estimated that the legal
and banking fees could reach $500 million.2 Even in smaller M&A deals,
transaction fees can be substantial. Accordingly, corporate taxpayers
have genuine concerns about the proper tax treatment of such large costs
and, specifically, whether they will be deductible in the current tax year
or must be capitalized and amortized over the estimated life of the
investment.
1. See Stephen Lipin, Murphy's Law Doesn't Apply: The Conditions Are Perfect for Continued
Growth in Mergers, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1998, at R6.
2. See Patrick McGeehan, GTE's Bold Bid Could Generate Whopping Fees, Wall St. J., Oct. 17,
1997, at Cl. This figure represents an aggregate of all of the then current and potential future
expenses contemplated by all of the players involved in the 1997 MCI-WorldCom deal.
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Although the costs incurred by one corporation seeking to acquire
control of another corporation are easily characterized as capital
expenditures,3 the status of such fees when incurred by the target of a
merger or acquisition has proved more difficult to determine. The U.S.
Supreme Court seemingly resolved the issue in INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner,4 holding unanimously that legal, banking, and other fees
incurred by the target corporation of a friendly merger do not qualify for
deduction as ordinary and necessary business expenses under Internal
Revenue Code section 162' and therefore must be capitalized under
section 263.6 The Court reasoned that because the target taxpayer would
likely realize benefits beyond the year in which the expenditure was
incurred, such expenses were capital in nature and currently non-
deductible.7
Despite INDOPCO, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and numerous
corporate taxpayers continue to disagree over the proper tax treatment of
expenditures made by the targets of so-called "hostile" takeovers. The
IRS has long argued that the hostile-versus-friendly distinction is
irrelevant in determining the tax treatment of corporations involved in
such transactions.8 According to the IRS analysis, if an acquisition
occurs, long-term future benefits accrue to the target, necessitating the
capitalization of expenses leading to that result.9 Conversely, corporate
taxpayers argue that the hostile or friendly nature of a transaction
determines the treatment of related expenditures, so that costs the target
corporation incurred to defeat the hostile takeover are directly analogous
to expenses made to defend a business from attack, expenses thought to
be currently deductible."
In A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner," the Seventh
Circuit adopted the taxpayer's position and held that the taxpayer could
deduct legal, banking, and printing costs incurred to defend against a
3. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970); see infra Part I.B.
4. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
5. Id. at 88 (citing I.R.C. § 162 (1988)).
6. I.R.C. § 263 (1994).
7. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 88.
8. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (July 1, 1991).
9. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 187 (1995), rev'd, 119 F.3d 482 (7th
Cir. 1997).
10. See id.
11. 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997).
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hostile takeover as ordinary and necessary business expenses under
section 162.12 The court further held that many of the target's costs
associated with abandoned transactions qualified as loss deductions
under section 165.'"
This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit decided Staley incorrectly.
First, the court placed undue emphasis on the hostile nature of the
acquisition, erroneously likening the transaction to an actual threat to or
attack on the corporation, and injected a subjective factor into an area of
the law that relies on strict neutrality and objectivity. Second, although
section 165 is an appropriate means by which taxpayers might seek the
deduction of some legal and banking fees, the court in Staley treated this
section almost as an afterthought and failed to explain how taxpayers
should address their burden of proving such deductions.
Part I of this Note presents a brief summary of the relevant statutes
and cases culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
INDOPCO. Part II describes the facts, procedural history, and reasoning
of the Seventh Circuit's Staley decision. Part III argues that the Seventh
Circuit erred by applying a defense of business rationale for deductibility
to a hostile takeover, incorrectly differentiated friendly from hostile
takeovers in the tax context, and failed to address loss deductions under
section 165 correctly. Part IV concludes that the consummation of any
capital transaction compels the capitalization of related costs, but that the
taxpayer may still be able to deduct some costs under section 165 by
proving the costs were associated with abandoned transactions and did
not facilitate any transaction actually consummated.
I. DEDUCTIBILITY VERSUS CAPITALIZATION
Tax law has long recognized the principle of matching income and
expenses, specifically the rule requiring expenses to be allocated among
the years benefited by the expense. 4 If, however, an expenditure results
in the creation of an asset or the acquisition of property having a useful
life that extends beyond the close of the taxable year, that expenditure is
generally not deductible for the taxable year in which it was made and
12. Id. at491.
13. Id.
14. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 1105.2.5, at 105-45 (1st
ed. 1981). For a more general discussion, see Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation
12.01 (8th ed. 1997).
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instead will have to be capitalized over the life of the investment. 5
Because of both the time value of money and the fact that an immediate
deduction can reduce taxable income for the current tax year, taxpayers
generally consider immediate deductions more valuable than deductions
taken gradually over a number of years. Thus, for over sixty years, courts
have struggled with the difficulty of distinguishing deductible expenses
from those the taxpayer must capitalize. 6
A. The Statutory Framework: Sections 162, 263, and 165
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the deduction
of "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business."' 7 The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that the term "necessary" does not mean indispensable,
but, rather, embodies only the minimal requirement that the expense be
appropriate and helpful for the development of the taxpayer's business. 8
Accordingly, the classification of an expense is frequently determined by
the "ordinary" requirement. 9 The Court has defined ordinary expenses as
those that arise from transactions of common or frequent occurrence in
the type of business involved.2' However, these expenses do not have to
be made frequently in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make
them often; instead, they must be typical for members of the taxpayer's
class of business. 2
1
Capital investment expenditures fall under section 263(a), which
disallows deductions for "[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for
permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of
any property or estate," or "[a]ny amount expended in restoring property
or in making good the exhaustion thereof for which an allowance is or
has been made. 2 2 The cost of acquiring property that has a useful life
15. Id.; see also Chirelstein, supra note 14, 6.02.
16. See Peter L. Faber, INDOPCO: The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 Tax Law. 607 (1994).
17. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994).
18. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (citations omitted).
19. Id. ("The principle function of the term 'ordinary' in § 162(a) is to clarify the distinction,
often difficult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the nature
of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must be amortized over the useful life of the
asset").
20. See Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488,495 (1940).
21. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
22. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
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extending substantially beyond the close of the taxable year must be
capitalized rather than deducted as a current expense.' Capitalization, in
effect, prevents taxpayers from applying in the current tax year for
deductions more properly attributable to later tax years when the capital
assets will continue to produce income.'
The treatment of an outlay concededly connected with the taxpayer's
business thus boils down to the timing of the deduction and whether it
can be deducted at once to reduce the taxable income of the current year
or must be deducted over a period of years that relates to the asset's
useful life.' Capitalization applies not only to tangible property, such as
buildings and equipment, but also to intangible assets from which the
taxpayer expects to realize economic benefits in future years.26 A
taxpayer may amortize capital expenses associated with intangible assets
by deductions taken gradually over the useful life of the asset. Intangible
assets whose useful lives cannot be determined have a standard
amortization period of fifteen years.27
Additionally, section 165(a) provides: "There shall be allowed as a
deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise." '28 The courts and the IRS
generally recognize that expenses incurred in the development of plans
involving the organization or reorganization of corporations become
deductible as a loss in the year the plans are abandoned.29 A taxpayer
may deduct expenditures related to an abandoned project in the year of
abandonment because at that point it becomes clear that the expenditures
will not produce any future benefit."
23. See Chirelstein, supra note 14, 6.02.
24. See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).
25. See Chirelstein, supra note 14, 6.02.
26. Id.
27. See I.RLC. § 197 (1994); see also Chirelstein, supra note 14, 6.10. The addition of§ 197 by
the 1993 Act put an end to numerous controversies between taxpayers and the IRS over the
treatment of purchased intangibles. At present, the cost of most intangibles acquired in connection
with the purchase of a business may be amortized on a straight-line basis over a 15-year period. The
15-year term, though completely arbitrary, has the benefit of simplicity and ease of application.
28. I.RC. § 165 (1994).
29. See, e.g., A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 200 (1995) (citations
omitted), rev'd, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997).
30. Id.
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B. Deductibility and Capitalization in the Context of Mergers
andAcquisitions
It is well established that in applying the statutory standards to M&As,
acquirers must capitalize their acquisition costs. In United States v.
Hilton Hotels Corp.,3 the U.S. Supreme Court held that litigation
expenses the acquirer incurred in connection with its valuation of the
target's stock for a hotel merger were capital expenditures rather than
business deductions.32 In Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner,33 the
Eleventh Circuit similarly held that accounting fees the taxpayer incurred
to investigate the financial condition of a target in connection with the
taxpayer's acquisition of the target's stock must also be capitalized.34 The
court reasoned that, to the purchaser, the outlays form part of the cost of
the acquisition of an asset that will contribute to revenues over an
extended future period, and that taxpayers should deduct such outlays
over the period of revenue production.35 Although certain specific
expenses the acquirer may have become obligated to pay as a result of
the merger may be deductible,36 the general rule requires corporations to
capitalize expenses incurred in the acquisition of another corporation.
Prior to INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,37 the U.S. Supreme Court
had not directly addressed whether expenses incurred by the target of
an acquisition should be deducted immediately or capitalized. In
INDOPCO, the Court held that legal and banking fees incurred by the
target of a friendly takeover did not qualify for deduction as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under section 162(a), but instead had to be
capitalized under section 263(a).38 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
divided its analysis into three parts: (1) reexamination of the relationship
31. 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
32. Id. at 583.
33. 688 F.2d 1376 (1lth Cir. 1982).
34. Id. at 1379.
35. Id.
36. See Rev. Rul. 67-408, 1967-2 C.B. 84 (ruling that acquirer's severance payments to target's
employees who were terminated due to merger constituted ordinary and necessary business expenses
deductible under 1LRC. § 162).
37. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
38. Id. at 88. Though the Court described the transaction in INDOPCO as a "friendly" takeover,
nowhere in the opinion did the Court indicate that the "friendly" aspect of the transaction was
significant to or dispositive of the holding. Neither did the Court indicate that the outcome would
differ if the takeover were considered "hostile."
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between deductions and capital expenditures;39 (2) rejection of the
separate and distinct asset test presented by the taxpayer;40 and
(3) discussion of the reasons why the taxpayer's transaction costs were
not deductible.41
The Court began by reiterating the old and familiar rule that an
income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and the taxpayer
bears the burden of clearly showing a right to the claimed deduction.42
The Court emphasized that deductions must be strictly construed and
allowed only when a clear provision permits them.43 Amid this
recapitulation of settled tax concepts, the Court inserted its own
significant addition to the subject, stating that deductions are "exceptions
to the norm of capitalization," and that, because deductions are
specifically enumerated in the Tax Code, they are subject to disallowance
in favor of capitalization.' In short, the Court made it very clear that the
Tax Code must be applied with a strong presumption in favor of
capitalization unless the taxpayer shows evidence supporting a
deduction.
The taxpayer in 1NDOPCO relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's
separate and distinct asset test from Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings &
Loan Ass'n,45 arguing that Lincoln Savings indicated deductibility was
the rule rather than the exception,46 and that the Tax Code required
capitalization only if the expense resulted in the "creation or
enhancement of an asset."47  Having already established that
capitalization is the norm and deductibility the exception, the Court
disposed of this interpretation of Lincoln Savings by stating that the
separate and distinct asset test was not the sole test for capitalization, and
39. Id. at 84.
40. Id. at 86-87.
41. Id. at 88-89.
42. Id at 84.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 403 U.S. 345 (1971). In Lincoln Savings, the Court was asked to decide whether certain
premiums, required by federal statute to be paid by a savings and loan association to the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), were ordinary and necessary business expenses
under § 162(a). Id. at 345-46. The Court held that the premiums served to create or enhance for
Lincoln "a separate and distinct additional asset" with the inevitable consequence that the payment
was capital in nature and thus not a deductible expense under § 162(a). Id. at 354.
46. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 86.
47. Id.
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that the creation of a separate and distinct asset, though perhaps
sufficient, is not a necessary condition to classification as a capital
expenditure.48
Having established that capitalization could be required for other
reasons, the Court approached the issue of characterizing expenditures
that result in future benefits to the taxpayer. The Court emphasized the
taxpayer's realization of future benefits, stating that the presence of a
future benefit, or some future aspect, is "undeniably important" in
determining the appropriate tax treatment of the expenditure.49 In
applying this principle, the Court identified two future benefits extending
beyond the tax year in question that would accrue to the taxpayer from
the merger: the synergy achieved through the merger of two
complimentary corporations and the stability of changing from a publicly
held corporation at the mercy of the marketplace into a wholly-owned
subsidiary.5" Finally, the Court reiterated the more general rule that
expenses incurred to change the corporate structure for the benefit of
future operations are not ordinary and necessary business expenses and
should always be capitalized."'
INDOPCO marked a further clarification of the proper tax treatment
of expenditures related to M&A transactions. Before INDOPCO, the
transaction costs incurred by acquirers in both hostile and friendly
acquisitions were always capitalized. After INDOPCO, the transaction
costs of target corporations in friendly acquisitions also had to be
capitalized. The tax treatment of fees incurred by the targets of hostile
takeovers, however, was not explicitly addressed by an appellate court
until the Seventh Circuit's 1997 decision in A.E. Staley Manufacturing
Co. v. Commissioner.
52
48. Id. at 87.
49. Id. Unfortunately, the "undeniably important" language is undeniably fuzzy. Although the
Court had little trouble applying it to the facts in INDOPCO, some commentators have criticized the
opinion for not establishing a clearer rule and not indicating the applicable scope of the decision
beyond the world of M&A deals. See Faber, supra note 16, at 623-24.
50. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 88-89.
51. Id. at 89.
52. 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997).
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Il. A.E. STALEYMANUFACTURING CO. V. COMMISSIONER
In 1988, A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. (Staley)53 became the target
of a successful hostile takeover bid by Tate & Lyle. Staley sought to
deduct as ordinary and necessary business expenses all the costs it
incurred resisting the tender offer. The Tax Court held that Staley's
expenditures were capital in nature and denied the deduction. 4 The
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the bulk of the fees were incurred
in defending the taxpayer's business from attack and were thus
deductible under section 162."5 Alternatively, the court held that most of
the fees were also associated with plans for abandoned capital
transactions and thus deductible as losses under section 165.56
A. Facts
In 1986, because of both the threat of a hostile tender offer made by
an investment banker for Staley and the general M&A climate at the
time, the Staley board of directors began to fear the possibility of other
hostile takeover attempts." In response, the board hired a law firm to
develop various anti-takeover devices and retained investment banking
firms to advise it in the case of future hostile takeover attempts." The
investment bankers advised the board to find "white knight" investors to
acquire enough stock in Staley to block further hostile takeover
attempts.5 9 Accordingly, Staley negotiated with Tate & Lyle about the
possibility of the firm acquiring a twenty percent interest in Staley.' By
August 1987, Tate & Lyle had already acquired four percent.61 However,
53. In 1984, Staley began to acquire several additional corporations, and to this end the board
formed SCI to act as the parent company for Staley and its various acquisitions. Even though the
courts refer to the target company as SCI, for simplicity this Note will refer to SCI and its family of
holdings as Staley. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 168-69 (1995), rev'd,
119 F.3d 482.
54. IL at200-01.
55. Staley, 119 F.3d at 491.
56. Id. at 490.
57. Staley, 105 T.C. at 170. n 1986, Staley believed that it had become the potential target of a
leveraged buy-out by the venture capital firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 171.
60. Id. The CEOs of both corporations also "casually discussed" the possibility of a merger
though no substantive merger discussions actually occurred. Id
61. Id.
Washington Law Review
Tate & Lyle refused to sign a standstill agreement limiting the amount of
stock it would purchase, and it soon became apparent that Tate & Lyle
was not the "white" knight the board had originally envisioned.62
In April 1988, Tate & Lyle made a tender offer directly to Staley's
public shareholders.63 Staley's board considered the tender offer hostile
because Tate & Lyle made it directly to the shareholders without the
board's knowledge, endorsement, or encouragement. ' Nevertheless, the
board understood that it had a duty to evaluate the merits of the tender
offer.65 It subsequently hired investment bankers to evaluate the tender
offer and explore ways of resisting the takeover by finding alternatives
more appealing to the shareholders.66 Over the next month, the Staley
board and the investment bankers actively sought alternatives to the
merger with Tate & Lyle that would be acceptable to the shareholders.67
Meanwhile, after repeatedly increasing the amount of its bid, Tate &
Lyle eventually submitted a purchase price that Staley's investment
bankers considered fair and acceptable.68 Although the investment
bankers continued to seek alternatives, Staley's attorneys had already
entered into negotiations with Tate & Lyle on May 10, 1988. On
May 13, at a meeting of the Staley board, the directors agreed that no
realistic alternatives remained that would better meet the interests of the
shareholders, and that Tate & Lyle's offer price of $36.50 per common
share appeared fair and reasonable. The Staley board then recommended
that the shareholders accept the offer and Tate & Lyle proceeded to
acquire all of the stock.69 During the course of negotiations, Staley paid
substantial fees for legal, investment banking, and printing services,
which it sought to deduct as ordinary and necessary business expenses.7"
62. Id. at 171-72.
63. Id. at 172.
64. Id. at 173.
65. Id. at 174.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 175. The investment bankers investigated Staley's various options, such as the sale of
the corporation as a whole; the sale of a division; a recapitalization; a leveraged buy-out, placement
of blocks of stock; a spin-off; a public offering; and commencing an offer for Tate & Lyle (the "pac-
man" defense). Note that the costs associated with any of these options would have to be capitalized
if the resulting transaction were successfully consummated. Id.; see infra Part IV.A.
68. Staley, 105 T.C. at 178.
69. Id
70. Id. at 180. The Tax Court wrote:
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B. Procedural History
The IRS disallowed the deductions and determined a deficiency, after
which the taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court to set aside the deficiency.7'
In an en bane decision, the Tax Court held that none of the fees
incurred to defend against the takeover qualified for deduction under
either section 162 or 165.72 It reasoned that for tax purposes, no
distinction exists between hostile and friendly takeovers; accordingly,
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner should apply equally to hostile take-
overs.73 In response to the taxpayer's assertion that the Staley board
incurred the expenses because it believed them necessary to defend the
company from attack, the Tax Court stated that because the relevant Tax
Code provisions sought to match expense with income, the board's
subjective reasons for making the expenditures were irrelevant to the
analysis.74 The Tax Court further stated that under the well-established
"origin of claim" test,75 the objective nature of the transaction out of
which the expenditure in controversy arises determines the proper tax
treatment regardless of the subjective motives of the taxpayer.76 The Tax
Court determined that, objectively, the expenditures were made in
[Staley] paid $23,052,914 to law firms, investment bankers, and other vendors for services in
connection with [its] response to the Tate & Lyle tender offer, all of which it deducted on its
short-year return for the period ended May 31, 1988. This amount included $6,238,109 that was
paid to First Boston; $6,272,593 that was paid to Merrill Lynch; and $165,318 that was paid to
Charles P. Young, a printing company ....
Id.
71. Id. at 167.
72. Id. at 181. The case provided the Tax Court with its first opportunity to apply the broad
principles established by the U.S. Supreme Court in INDOPCO to the target corporation in a hostile
takeover situation. Eleven judges joined the majority opinion, one concurred in the result only, four
joined the concurring opinion, and five dissented. Id. at 201 (Foley, J., concurring in result only),
201 (Beghe, J., concurring), 210 (Cohen, J., dissenting), and 218 (Laro, J., dissenting).
73. LLd at 197-98.
74. Id. at 194.
75. Id. at 195. The Tax Court wrote:
In the companion cases of Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), and United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court held that fees
incurred to value stock held by dissident minority shareholders were capital expenditures, rather
than expenses deductible under sections 162(a) or 212. In so holding, the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected a subjective 'primary purpose' test in favor of the objective 'origin of the claim' test set
forth in United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
Id.
76. let
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connection with a change in ownership, and this change in ownership
necessarily resulted in "indefinite and extended future consequences" to
the taxpayer.77 In short, the Tax Court held that corporate taxpayers may
not deduct expenditures made incident to a recapitalization or other
reorganization even if undertaken to protect the corporation against the
threat of acquisition."
Finally, the Tax Court dismissed the taxpayer's contention that the
fees qualified for a loss deduction under section 165 as costs related to
plans and defenses eventually abandoned in the face of the inevitability
of the takeover.79 The Tax Court held that the taxpayer failed to prove
any allocation of the fees to separate and distinct proposals that it
subsequently abandoned, and that the bulk of the fees were tied to a
completed stock sale rather than an abandoned recapitalization."
C. The Seventh Circuit's Analysis
In A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner,"' the Seventh
Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding that Staley could deduct the bulk
of the costs incurred to defend against the hostile takeover under
section 162, as ordinary and necessary business expenses, and
alternatively, under section 165, as costs associated with abandoned
capital transactions.8 2 The court began by noting the U.S. Supreme
Court's language in INDOPCO placing the burden of showing a right to
a business deduction on the taxpayer and mandating that deductions are a
matter of legislative grace, exceptions to the norm of capitalization, and
should be strictly construed.83 However, the court then stated that the
burden on the taxpayer, though "a real one," is not insurmountable."
77. Id. at 197.
78. Id at 197-98.
79. Id at200.
80. Id Four judges, although agreeing with the majority opinion, wrote separately to propose a
"shareholder benefit" or "constructive dividend" theory by which courts could reach the same result
without having to search for ever-illusive future benefits. Id at 203. For a brief discussion of this
theory, see Calvin H. Johnson, Snarling for the Cameras: Hostility and Takeover Expense
Deductions, Tax Notes, Aug. 4, 1997, at 689, 689.
81. 119 F.3d482 (7th Cir. 1997).
82. See id at491.
83. Id. at 486 (quoting INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992)).
84. Id.
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In finding that the fees incurred by Staley qualified for deduction, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned that the majority of the fees related directly to
defending the business from an attack because of Staley's struggle
against a threat to its business operations and policies." Likening the
hostile takeover to a threat to or attack upon the corporation, the court
applied the rationale that a taxpayer may deduct expenses incurred in
defending a business and its policies from attack as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under section 162.86
The court laid the foundation of its business defense rationale with a
brief discussion of three separate U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In
Commissioner v. Heininger,87 the U.S. Supreme Court held deductible
the taxpayer's legal fees incurred in litigating against an order by the
Postmaster General depriving the taxpayer's mail order business of use
of the mails.8 The Court reasoned that the Postmaster General's legal
action threatened to destroy the taxpayer's business. Thus, the taxpayer's
cost to employ an attorney to aid in the defense of his business was both
ordinary and necessary, and therefore deductible under the Tax Code.89
In Commissioner v. Tellier,9 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed this
principle, holding that under section 162(a) the taxpayer could deduct
costs incurred to defend against criminal charges originating from his
business activities.9' Finally, the Seventh Circuit referred to the famous
opinion in Welch v. Helvering,92 in which Justice Cardozo wrote that a
taxpayer may deduct attorney fees paid to defend against legal action as
ordinary and necessary expenses, even though such an attack "may
happen once in a lifetime."'93
The court also discussed some lower court decisions that had applied
the rationale to what the court characterized as similar contexts. In Locke
Manufacturing Cos. v. United States,94 a district court judge held that a
85. Id. at 490.
86. Id. at491-92.
87. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
88. Id at471.
89. I at 471-72.
90. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
91. Id at 690.
92. 290 U.S. 111 (1933) (holding that payments made by taxpayer to creditors of bankrupt
corporation to strengthen his own standing and credit were not deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses).
93. Id at 114.
94. 237 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1964).
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company could deduct its proxy contest expenses in successfully
resisting a stockholder's challenge, including legal fees, proxy solicitor's
fees, and public relations fees.95 The Staley court quoted language from
that opinion indicating that "it was ordinary for a company to spend
money 'to defend the policies of its directors from attack by those who
would oppose them."'96 The Staley court also noted that the IRS now
considers Locke's holding as established law. 97 Finally, the court cited
one of its earlier decisions holding that a taxpayer may deduct payments
made to protect an established business.98 The court stated that
INDOPCO never addressed this line of authority because there the U.S.
Supreme Court was dealing with the capitalization of expenses
associated with a friendly merger.99
Having established the rule that expenses incurred to defend a
business from attack are deductible, the Seventh Circuit stated that the
key determination was whether Staley's expenses were "more properly
viewed as costs associated with defending a business or costs associated
with facilitating a capital transaction."'" In reaching its answer, the
Seventh Circuit considered the hostile nature of the takeover the crucial
and determining factual element, stating that "[t]he totality of the Tax
Court's factual findings makes clear that [Staley] was defending against
an unwanted acquisition in an effort to maintain and protect an
established business.''. The court therefore held that the costs were
defensive and hence deductible.0 2 However, the court did find that a few
95. Id. at 89.
96. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482,488 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Locke, 237
F. Supp. at 86-87).
97. Id.; see also Central Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 234, 248 (1967) (holding that
proxy fight expenses incurred by prevailing stockholders/incoming managers and paid by company
were deductible).
98. Staley, 119 F.3d at 488 (citing Allen v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 785, 790-91 (7th Cir. 1960)).
In Allen, the court was asked to decide, inter alia, the tax treatment of the taxpayer's $10,000
payment to creditors, which he was not obligated to make, but which he made only to protect his.
business reputation and credit standing. Allen, 283 F.2d at 790. The Allen court distinguished the
case from Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), stating that the payments in Welch were made to
establish good will or business standing and thus were not deductible, but that the taxpayer in Allen
sought to protect his existing business reputation and credit, making the $10,000 deductible an
ordinary and necessary business expense. Allen, 283 F.2d at 791.
99. Staley, 119 F.3d at 488.
100. Id. at 489. In essence, the Seventh Circuit, like the Tax Court, was applying the "origin of the
claim" test to the expenditures; see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
101. Staley, 119 F.3dat490.
102. Id. at491.
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of the services performed by the investment bankers helped to facilitate
the eventual merger and should be capitalized. 3 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit required the Tax Court on remand to reevaluate all of the
expenses to identify those actually deductible and those that should be
capitalized for facilitating the completed transaction. 4
As an additional basis for deductibility, the Seventh Circuit found that
many of the taxpayer's costs also qualified for loss deduction treatment
under section 165(a), citing to other courts that had generally held that
taxpayers may take loss deductions for costs associated with abandoned
capital transactions."'5 Thus, a taxpayer may deduct the cost for various
plans designed by the investment bankers involving capital transactions,
especially when formulated as alternatives to or defenses against a
hostile takeover, if they are eventually abandoned or never used.'06 Staley
solicited and considered plans for numerous types of capital transactions
as alternatives to the takeover, but abandoned them all when the merger
eventually occurred.0 7 The court held that Staley could therefore deduct
the fees paid to investment bankers in connection with these abandoned
transactions as abandonment losses under section 165(a)." 8
Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION
As a matter of law and policy, the Seventh Circuit erred in A.E. Staley
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner"°9 in permitting the taxpayer to
deduct costs associated with the acquisition as ordinary and necessary
expenses incurred to defend a business. In applying a defense of business
rationale for deduction in the context of a hostile takeover, the Seventh
Circuit over-emphasized the alleged "hostility" of what was essentially a
capital transaction and ignored the U.S. Supreme Court's emphasis on
future benefits in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner."' All the cases the
court relied upon in support of the defense of business rationale are
103. Id. The court specifically mentioned the investment bankers' work of evaluating the true
value of the company's stock and the performance of "some facilitative function near the end of the
process." Id.
104. Id at 492-93.
105. d at490.
106. Id
107. Id
108. ld at490-91.
109. 119 F.3d482.
110. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
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distinguishable from Staley as well as other M&A transactions
generally."' In addition, the court placed undue importance on subjective
language commonly employed in the context of hostile takeovers to
reach the conclusion that the corporate enterprise faced a threat or attack.
For purposes of taxation, no sound basis exists for distinguishing
between hostile and friendly takeovers, and the costs associated with
such transactions should be capitalized under INDOPCO.
Drawing a distinction between friendly and hostile takeovers when
determining the appropriate tax treatment of the transaction costs
undercuts important policy goals. M&A deals are highly complex
transactions, and their subjective nature often changes repeatedly over
the meandering course of the deal. Because they frequently involve a
bewildering mixture of hostile and friendly attributes, attempting to
distinguish defensive and facilitative expenditures based upon the
hostile-friendly distinction creates enormous practical difficulties for
courts, taxpayers, and the IRS.
Finally, although the Seventh Circuit correctly allowed a deduction
for expenditures related to abandoned transactions under section 165, it
erred in failing to emphasize that such loss deductions include a very
limited category of expenditures, and that the burden of seeking and
proving such loss deductions rests with the taxpayer. By simply
remanding the task of cost allocation to the Tax Court without any
guidance as to how future taxpayers should be required to seek
section 165 loss deductions, the court missed an opportunity to establish
a clear and workable standard for taking such deductions.
A. A Defense of Business Rationale Should Not Apply to
Hostile Takeovers
In Staley, the Seventh Circuit stated the law correctly regarding the
deductibility of expenses incurred to defend a business,"2 but erred in
applying the rationale in the context of a hostile takeover. A hostile
takeover bid is not an attack or threat of the type envisioned by the
defense of business rationale. The cases cited by the Seventh Circuit in
support of its theory all involved costs incurred to defend against
actions-usually legal actions-with the potential to significantly hinder
111. See infra Part M.A.
112. See supra Part B.C.
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or destroy the ability of the business to operate."' By contrast, the
investment banking and printing costs Staley incurred went toward
efforts to find alternatives to Tate & Lyle's tender offer, all of which
involved various forms of corporate reorganization or recapitalization." 4
These alternatives are more properly viewed as attempts to compete for
the continuing support and investment of the shareholders in the face of
ever-improving terms and conditions offered by outside bidders. The
Seventh Circuit likened the "hostility" of the hostile takeover to a lawsuit
brought against a corporation or some other action taken by an
independent party to prevent the corporation from operating." 5 However,
management of the target usually labels the takeover "hostile" not
because the takeover attacks the corporation or threatens its ability to
continue as a profit-generating entity, but because management either
does not welcome the change or finds the price offered by the acquirer
unsatisfactory." 6
1. The Cases Cited by the Seventh Circuit Are Distinguishable
from Staley
All the cases the Seventh Circuit presented to buttress its application
of the defense of business rationale are legally and factually
distinguishable from Staley. The Heininger, Tellier, and Welch cases,
which together provide the basis for the court's theory, all involved
expenses incurred by taxpayers to defend against legal action directed at
the activities of or related to the taxpayer's business."' Taken together,
these cases stand for the simple proposition that expenses incurred to
defend one's business against legal action are both ordinary and
necessary, and thus deductible under section 162. Nothing in these cases
suggests that the rationale should extend to any and all perceived threats
to the taxpayer.
Before the Staley decision, some tax experts theorized that the
expenses a corporation paid to resist a hostile tender offer might be
deductible because of their similarity to the deductible cost of defending
113. See supra Part I.C.
114. See supra note 67.
115. See supra Part Il.C.
116. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 174-75 (1995), rev'd, 119 F.3d
482 (7th Cir. 1997).
117. See supra Part ll.C.
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a proxy fight." 8 They suggested that the taxpayers in both situations
incurred the costs primarily to protect the business rather than to acquire
property, and that both situations involved questions of corporate
policy." 9 The Seventh Circuit in Staley adopted precisely this view in
drawing a parallel between the deductibility of management's proxy
contest expenses in Locke Manufacturing Cos. v. United States,2 ' and
the costs the Staley board incurred in resisting the Tate & Lyle
takeover.' However, a proxy contest usually involves a dispute within
the corporation between management and a portion of the share-
holders-a dissident group-for control of the board and over the
policies of the corporation," not for control of shares in the corporation.
The board in Locke argued, and the court agreed, that the taxpayer
incurred the fees for the benefit of all the shareholders in the good faith
belief that the best interests of the corporation and all the shareholders
collectively required resisting the dissident shareholders." Thus, the
board and the IRS viewed the proxy fight as an attack upon the stated
policies of the corporation and the interests of the shareholders
collectively. 4
In contrast, a tender offer-whether hostile or friendly, solicited or
unsolicited-is in essence an offer by an outside party to purchase the
shares of the corporation from the shareholders on the open market, and
nothing more. Whether or not the stated intentions of the acquirer
contradict the policies of the target's board, the transaction in its purest
form involves simply the buying and selling of shares in a publicly
traded corporation. In short, management of the target in a hostile
takeover does not defend the collective interests of the shareholders as in
a proxy fight; it competes with the outside buyer on the open market for
the continuing support and investment of the target's shareholders.
In Staley, Tate & Lyle did not attack, seek damages against, or attempt
to prevent Staley from operating as a profitable business. On the
contrary, Tate & Lyle appreciated Staley's considerable worth and saw
118. See Boris I. Bittker & James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 5.04[4], at 5-26 (6th ed. 1994).
119. Id.
120. 237 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1964).
121. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482,488 (7th Cir. 1997).
122. See Black's Law Dictionary 512 (Pocket ed. 1996).
123. See Locke, 237 F. Supp. at 85.
124. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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the corporation as such a good investment that it decided to buy it in its
entirety."~ Staley's board labeled the bid hostile because Tate & Lyle
made the bid without management's knowledge.'26 The word "hostile" in
the M&A context simply describes the manner in which one corporation
makes a tender offer to another.'27 In the end, the intrinsic fairness and
reasonableness of Tate & Lyle's final tender offer, not a court of law,
compelled the Staley board to recommend that the shareholders accept
it. 28
None of the other cases the Seventh Circuit cited support the
deductibility of expenses related to M&A transactions. 29 In NCNB
Corp. v. United States,3 the Fourth Circuit characterized various
expenditures in connection with the taxpayer's establishment of a
statewide network of branch banks as current expenses rather than capital
costs.' Not only was the case factually unrelated to M&A deals, but the
Fourth Circuit based its decision on the now defunct "separate and
distinct asset test" and the circuit court's assertion that the presence of
future benefits does not control the tax treatment of expenditures. 32 Such
a holding can no longer stand in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in INDOPCO, and its explicit mandate that future
benefits are undeniably important in classifying expenditures.
33
Additionally, the NCNB decision's language relating to the "protection"
of existing investments and businesses relied on another case of
questionable precedential value following INDOPCO's rejection of the
separate and distinct asset test.' 31 In short, the deductible protective
125. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 179 (1995), rev'd, 119 F.3d 482.
126. Id. at 173.
127. See Lee A. Sheppard, Will There Ever Be Another Friendly Takeover?, Tax Notes, July 28,
1997, at 461, 461 ("The reality of being a publicly traded corporation is that there is really no such
thing as a hostile takeover. There are only offers that managers and boards believe are
insufficient... 'Hostile' is a construct; what is really going on is no more hostile than professional
wrestling.").
128. See Staley, 105 T.C. at 179.
129. See Staley, 119 F.3d at488 n.2.
130. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
131. Id. at294.
132. Id. at 290-93.
133. See supra Part I.B.
134. See Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785-86 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding
that under separate and distinct asset test taxpayer's expenditures would be capitalized only if they
served to create or enhance separate and distinct additional asset).
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expenses in NCNB Corp. that the Seventh Circuit referred to would
likely require capitalization today under INDOPCO.
131
In Fishing Tackle Products Co. v. Commissioner,136 the Tax Court
allowed a current deduction for payments by a parent corporation to its
subsidiary to reimburse the subsidiary for net operating losses sustained
in supplying the parent because the court considered the payments
essential to the survival of the taxpayer's business.' In Lutz v.
Commissioner,138 the Fifth Circuit held that the taxpayer could deduct
costs incurred to keep its business license, an item essential to the
continued operation and existence of the business. 39 The costs at issue in
both cases are entirely unrelated to M&A transaction costs, and, after
1993, the costs in Lutz would no longer qualify for deduction in any
case. 4' None of the above cases apply to costs related to the buying and
selling of a corporation's shares and are thus readily distinguishable from
the market-driven circumstances surrounding the merger or acquisition
of a publicly traded corporation.
2. Semantics Unduly Influenced the Seventh Circuit's Reasoning
The language employed by participants and observers to describe
various M&A deals has clouded the taxation issue. In placing undue
emphasis on subjective language, the Seventh Circuit fell victim to the
misleading influence of the M&A lexicon. Evocative and warlike
terminology has been universally adopted to describe the action and
actors in such transactions. 4' Some commentators characterize a certain
135. See NCNB Corp., 684 F.2d at 290.
136. 27 T.C. 638 (1957).
137. Id. at 644. The court also allowed a current deduction for rental payments paid by the
subsidiary for a factory site, but disallowed deductions for fees incurred to increase the corporation's
authorized capital. Id. at 645.
138. 282 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1960).
139. Id. at 615-16.
140. See I.R.C. § 197(a), (d)(1)(D) (1994). Under I.1.C. § 197, costs related to obtaining or
keeping a business license, which is considered a business intangible, are no longer deductible and
must be amortized over a 15-year period.
141. Journalists, judges, attorneys, executives, and bankers regularly describe hostile takeovers in
such terms. See, e.g, James F. Hogg, Hostile Takeovers and Other War Games, in James F. Hogg
et al., The Predator and the Predatee: Thoughtfid Perspectives on Hostile Takeovers 2-3 (1988) ("In
some cases, the attacks have been fatal-the company sold, broken up and the business dissipated. In
others, the company has been damaged and seriously weakened by the attack, but not overcome.").
For other examples, see Bryan Burrough & John Helyar, The Barbarians at the Gate (1990)
[hereinafter Burrough & Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate] (comprising best known treatment in
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transaction as a "hostile takeover," an "attack" on the present
management, or a "threat" by a "corporate raider" to "dismember" the
"target" company, while others describe the same transaction as an
"unsolicited bid" for a publicly traded corporation undervalued by the
market because "entrenched" management is leading the corporation in
the wrong "strategic" direction.'42 To those favoring the unsolicited bid,
the acquirer is simply a purchaser who understands the potential value of
the target but who disagrees with the target's management and therefore
presents its offer directly to the shareholders of the target. Those who
oppose the same acquisition view the unsolicited tender offer as
tantamount to an attack on the corporation, its policies, and management.
The M&A vocabulary provides a convenient, illustrative way for
participants and observers to understand, describe, and pass judgment on
these transactions as they unfold. Such language should not, however,
influence the appropriate tax treatment of corporations involved in what
remain, simply, capital transactions.
The Seventh Circuit's ready adoption of a defense of business
rationale highlights the court's unquestioning acceptance of the language
employed and the resulting impression that the Staley board was
compelled to react to a genuine attack. The court believed that the Staley
board had little choice but to hire investment bankers to defend the
corporation from a threat. However, the voluntary or compulsory nature
of an expense should not impact how courts characterize the expense. 43
Although commonly referred to as "defensive strategies" by courts and
popular press of what until recently was largest takeover in U.S. history: "battle" for control of RJR
Nabisco in 1988), and Bryan Burrough & John Helyar, You Call This a Takeover?, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 12, 1997, at A22 (chastising civility of 1997 MCI-WorldCom deal and lamenting passing of
epic takeover battles of 1980s). Burrough and Helyar write:
A takeover has name-calling and mudslinging and lawsuits and press leaks. A takeover has short
men who threaten each others' kneecaps ....
Are there no barbarians left?... Give us a doomed antihero like T. Boone Pickens who
mounts Quixotic charges against Gulf Oil. Give us a scoundrel like Carl Icahn who hounds the
wounded and tortures the meek. Give us an all-powerful supervillain at Drexel Burnham
Lambert who lurks behind an X-shaped desk, orchestrating sinister deals aimed at wreaking
havoc on the Fortune 500.
Id
142. See supra note 141.
143. See Faber, supra note 16, at 614 ("While we may sympathize with a taxpayer who incurs
expenses to remedy a defect that was beyond its control ... this should not be relevant in
determining how to allocate the taxpayer's income among different fiscal periods.").
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practitioners alike, much of the investment bankers' work, apart from
formulating alternative capital transactions, involve estimating the true
value of a corporation's shares above the listed market price and
subsequently advertising that value to the media, the marketplace, and
other potential suitors. Having already internalized the combative
language and its subjective treatment of the transaction, the Seventh
Circuit readily accepted the taxpayer's characterization of these expenses
as being purely defensive. Adopting this jargon led the court to jump to
the erroneous conclusion that the defense of business cases parallel
M&A transactions.
B. Hostile and Friendly Acquisitions Should Not Be Distinguishedfor
Tax Purposes
Treating hostile and friendly acquisitions differently for tax purposes
draws a distinction that objectively does not exist. Recent empirical tests
analyzing the accounting and stock performance data of 2048 tender
offers between 1975 and 1994 demonstrate that in pure economic terms
hostile takeovers are indistinguishable from friendly takeovers.1"
Furthermore, most of the hostile aspects of a takeover arguably reflect
"strategic choices" implemented by both the acquirer and the target to
"maximize their respective gains from [the] transaction."' 4 Shareholders
in publicly traded corporations may freely sell their shares to anyone
willing to buy them. They may sell their shares individually, in blocks,
or, as in the Staley case, they may collectively agree at the
recommendation of the target's board of directors to sell all the common
stock in the corporation to a single buyer. In short, publicly traded
corporations are for sale every day the securities markets are open. 46 The
alleged hostility or friendliness does not alter the fundamental nature of
the transaction as a taxable event.
Problems arise when attempting to characterize a particular
transaction as hostile, friendly, or something in between. Most M&A
deals in fact contain both hostile and friendly elements. 47 The Seventh
Circuit's decision ignores the difficulty of assessing the true nature of
144. Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the
Beholder? 2-3 (visited Feb. 2, 1998) <http://papers.ssm.com/paper.qry?abstract_id=48304>.
145. Id. at 36.
146. Sheppard, supra note 127, at 461.
147. See Comment & Schwert, supra note 144, at 1.
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these highly complex transactions at each stage of their development.
The deduction issues in this area have become quite confused because of
the variety of ways in which an initially hostile takeover attempt can play
out.'48 Mergers may begin friendly and turn hostile, or may begin hostile
and turn friendly.'49 Other factors may complicate attempted mergers,
such as the intrusion of competing third offers, auctions, and other
mutations of the original deal masking the true nature of the transaction
and the subjective motives and goals of the taxpayer. Even in a "classic"
hostile takeover such as the Staley case, Tate & Lyle, the object of the
hostility, began its relationship with Staley's board in the role of a "white
knight," or friendly investor.' It was Staley that originally invited
Tate & Lyle to acquire twenty percent of its stock, and the factual record
in the case shows that the CEOs of the two corporations had even
discussed the possibility of merging the two companies."5' Although
Staley sought out Tate & Lyle as a friendly investor primarily as a
defensive measure against future hostile takeover attempts, their
discussions indicate that both corporations appreciated their shared
strategic interests. If the two corporations had continued in a "friendly"
manner to commence a capital restructuring through either a merger or
Tate & Lyle's investment in a part of Staley's shares as originally
planned, all of Staley's associated costs would have to be capitalized
under INDOPCO. The deal turned hostile only when Tate & Lyle
changed its mind and decided to purchase much more than just twenty
percent of Staley's stock. The fundamental nature of this transaction,
however, did not differ from the capital options the parties previously
discussed.
Frequently, management of the target of a hostile takeover will
suddenly decide that the price offered by the acquirer-often as a result
148. See supra note 118.
149. See generally Victory Mkts., Inc. v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 648 (1992). As in the Staley
case, the taxpayer incurred costs for investment banking services after receiving an offer to be
acquired by another corporation. Id. at 652-53. Initially, the transaction appeared to be a hostile
takeover because the directors of the company rejected the tender offer as inadequate and adopted a
"poison pill" plan to deter the takeover. Id. at 654. However, the directors later accepted a
subsequent higher offer without activating the "poison pill" plan. Id. at 655. The taxpayer attempted
to characterize the takeover as hostile to argue that INDOPCO should not apply. Id. at 661-62. The
Tax Court held, however, that the transaction was in fact a friendly rather than a hostile takeover,
mandating the capitalization of the taxpayer's expenditures under INDOPCO. Id. at 665.
150. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 1997).
151. Id.
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of negotiations-meets its needs after all.152 In such cases, hostility may
simply illustrate situations where the process of fierce negotiations,
which in a friendly deal would proceed entirely behind closed doors, is
instead disclosed to the public well before the parties have reached
agreement on a list of outstanding issues.' One commentator describing
the eventual consummation of the Staley deal wrote that "[t]he Tate &
Lyle offer became too sweet, however, and the Staley directors
ultimately capitulated."' 54 Staley's management did not face a binding
court order the effect of which would harm or destroy the future of its
business. Their "capitulation" resulted from the undeniable value of Tate
& Lyle's final offer price obtained through open negotiations. Tate &
Lyle had simply presented the Staley shareholders with an offer too
sweet to refuse and more closely in line with their fiscal interests than
anything the Staley board could offer.
In short, ascertaining the true thoughts and motives of the parties
involved in a friendly or hostile takeover is often impossible. In a legal
battle in tort or contract between two corporations, reaching a resolution
or judgment often necessitates just such an inquiry into the parties'
motives and intentions. The determination of the proper tax treatment of
a corporation's expenditures, however, should not involve such
considerations. The Tax Code seeks to match outlays with revenues'
and does not investigate the taxpayer's reasons for incurring the costs.'56
When matching expenses with the income that they generate, the
objective benefit produced by the item should control, not the taxpayer's
purpose in incurring it.'57 Thus, expenditures associated with the
realization of a future benefit or some future aspect generally must be
capitalized. 5
152. See supra note 149; see also Christina Binkley & Greg Hitt, 177, Hilton Enter Talks on
Hostile Bid, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1997, at A3. Binkley and Hitt write: "After 10 months of reflising to
talk with Hilton Hotels Corp., ITT' Corp. entered into discussions with Hilton on its sweetened $9.3
billion hostile bid .... The ITr spokesman said the talks were prompted by Hilton's recently raised
bid. 'They finally put a respectable offer on the table,' he said." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even in
one of the most bitterly contested takeover battles of the 1990s, the crux of the "hostility" inevitably
boiled down to price.
153. See Comment & Schwert, supra note 144, at 1-2.
154. William L. Raby, 'Friendly' Is Not the Issue with Takeovers, Tax Notes, Sept. 25, 1995, at
1613, 1614.
155. See Staley, 119 F.3d at 489.
156. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
157. Faber, supra note 16, at 615.
158. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87 (1992).
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Making such subjective criteria the crucial determining factor also
creates the potential for widespread abuse. The Seventh Circuit is
effectively encouraging corporate taxpayers to push the limits of
credulity and attempt to attribute as many expenses as possible to
defensive measures devoid of any future benefit.'59 If, for example, a
court applied the principle established by the Seventh Circuit in Staley to
the factual scenario in 1NDOPCO, the taxpayer in that case could avoid
having to capitalize most of its expenses by characterizing the transaction
as hostile until immediately preceding the final merger.
Finally, under established tax expenditure analysis principles,
allowing a deduction indicates Congress's willingness to permit or often
encourage the activity that qualifies for the deduction. 6 In effect,
allowing taxpayers like Staley to deduct currently the costs of
"defensive" activities amounts to a governmental subsidy to parties
resisting tender offers. However, no compelling government interest
supports encouraging and helping corporate boards of directors to resist
tender offers. With capitalization as the norm, deductions must be
handled judiciously. Allowing, as the Seventh Circuit did, for the
deduction of such fees as a business expense serves both to encourage
and to subsidize such activities. It may be perfectly legal, appropriate,
and even justifiable for management to resist a tender offer, but this does
not mean that the activity merits special tax treatment by the federal
government.'
6
'
159. See Johnson, supra note 80, at 689. ("To separate out a hostile part of the haggling over
stock price in a single unitary takeover... is a rule just inviting abuse. In future cases, the parties
will be acting like professional wrestlers, snarling for the cameras, just to get some extra tax
deductions.").
160. See generally Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1970).
161. It is also important to note that the party seeking the deductions for costs incurred to resist
the acquisition is in fact the new owner of the corporation, originally the acquirer. While this
taxpayer awaits approval of its claimed deductions, Staley's original management is long gone and
the shareholders are no longer shareholders in Staley. While this taxpayer is capitalizing its
acquisition costs, it should not simultaneously be allowed to deduct costs related to the same
transaction simply because they were incurred by the former management of the target.
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C. The Seventh Circuit Erred in Failing to State that the Taxpayer
Bears the Burden of Seeking and Proving Loss Deductions Under
Section 165
Many of the costs incurred by the Staley board went toward
formulating plans for alternative capital transactions, which were
subsequently abandoned in favor of the deal with Tate & Lyle. Many of
these costs arguably qualify for a loss deduction under section 165, and
the taxpayer should have been permitted to demonstrate as much. The
taxpayer did argue before the Tax Court that both courts and the IRS
already recognize that when a taxpayer abandons a plan for
reorganization or a public offering, the taxpayer may deduct the
expenditures related to the proposed plan as a loss in the year it abandons
the plan. 62 The taxpayer may deduct the loss in the year of abandonment
because at that point the expenditures clearly will not produce any future
benefit. 63
The Tax Court agreed with this interpretation of the law, but held that
the taxpayer nevertheless had not proven any allocation of the fees paid
to the investment bankers to any separate and distinct proposals that it
had subsequently abandoned."6 Based on its analysis of the fee
arrangement between Staley and the bankers, the Tax Court
characterized all of the services performed by the bankers as integral
components of a unitary transaction, a single stock sale.'65 Under this
view, all of the fees were sufficiently related to a single capital
transaction to require that they all be capitalized.
The Seventh Circuit agreed that the fee arrangement was a relevant
consideration,'66 but proceeded to emphasize that the costs could and
should in fact be allocated between those incurred to facilitate the
eventual deal, and those directed toward failed defensive plans
abandoned upon consummation of the merger. 67 The Seventh Circuit
then instructed the Tax Court on remand to allocate a sum of the fees for
capitalization to the facilitative activities of the investment bankers and
162. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
164. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 200 (1995), rev'd, 119 F.3d 482
(7th Cir. 1997).
165. Id.
166. SeeStaley, 119F.3dat491.
167. Id.
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printer, 6 ' while acknowledging that making such an allocation would not
be a simple task. 69
The Seventh Circuit, like the Tax Court, was correct that the taxpayer
has a right to seek loss deductions under section 165, but the circuit court
nevertheless erred in failing to establish that the burden of proof for such
deductions rests with the taxpayer. Having invested so much effort in its
erroneous application of the defense of business rationale, the court
seemingly dealt with the application of loss deductions under section 165
as an afterthought. In its cursory treatment of the loss deduction issue,
the court missed an opportunity to establish a clear precedent as to how
taxpayers should apply for and prove the right to such loss deductions.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
Courts should adopt a bright-line rule that when management of the
target reaches an agreement with the acquirer and recommends the tender
offer to its shareholders, the cost of all services that proximately
contribute to the consummation of the transaction must be capitalized.
Courts should not consider the hostile versus friendly distinction in
determining the tax treatment of costs associated with any successfully
consummated merger, acquisition, or alternative capital transaction.
However, taxpayers should continue to have an opportunity to seek
limited loss deductions under section 165. Because both the Tax Court
and the Seventh Circuit correctly recognized the difficulty of
distinguishing defensive from facilitative costs, taxpayers and courts
should instead differentiate between "facilitative" costs (incurred to
effect the eventual transaction), and "non-facilitative" costs (unrelated to
the transaction actually consummated). Allowing loss deductions for
non-facilitative costs under section 165, but also enforcing strict criteria
as to how taxpayers identify which fees are thus deductible, protects both
the Tax Code's integrity and 1NDOPCO's mandate in properly
attributing capital expenditures to capital transactions while offering
taxpayers a more equitable and reasonable result.
168. Id. at 492-93.
169. Id. at 493.
Washington Law Review
A. INDOPCO Controls: Consummation of the Transaction Should
Generally Result in Capitalization
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner170 compels courts to assume that a
taxpayer may not deduct costs incurred in the course of a corporate
restructuring for the benefit of future operations. 7' Under INDOPCO,
courts presume that M&As, common forms of corporate restructuring,
result in significant future benefits to the newly formed entity.
Consequently, the target of such a merger or acquisition generally should
be required to capitalize expenses related to the transaction regardless of
how the transaction originated or proceeded.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court specifically addressed a friendly
merger in INDOPCO, for purposes of neutral and objective tax treatment
the principles advocated in that case should apply equally to all M&As.
The allegedly hostile or friendly nature of a takeover should have no
bearing on the proper capitalization of identifiable capital expenditures.
Both types of acquisitions result in the profound restructuring of existing
corporate entities; in both cases, the acquirer must always capitalize
expenses related to the transaction, because the Tax Code presumes that
the newly-formed corporate entity will realize significant future benefits
as a result of the restructuring. This presumption holds true even if the
new corporate entity does not in fact attain any future benefits. For the
same reason, the target in both types of acquisitions should also
capitalize expenses associated with the transaction.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged INDOPCO's relevance at the
beginning of its discussion.'72 It also noted that if a taxpayer were unable
to meet its burden of showing a right to a business deduction, then it
would have to capitalize its expenditures under section 263." Because
the Staley transaction involved a corporate restructuring that necessarily
presumed the presence of future benefits, the Seventh Circuit correctly
stated that Staley had the burden to prove the absence of any future
benefits and corresponding right to deduct the related costs. 74 Under the
Seventh Circuit's own reasoning, if Staley failed to meet its burden of
proof, it would have to capitalize the expenditures. In short, without the
170. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
171. Id. at 89.
172. See Staley, 119 F.3d at486.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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defense of business rationale for deduction, the Seventh Circuit would
have been compelled to require Staley to capitalize all of the costs
associated with the acquisition.
Management of the target corporations in 1NDOPCO and Staley have
one crucial element in common: both ultimately agreed to the acquisition
of their businesses.17 In both cases, the target boards eventually
recommended the transaction to their respective shareholders as in the
best interests of the shareholders and the corporation. As a result, the
acquisition succeeded in both cases. Regardless of how the deals
originated or played out, they resulted in a significant corporate
restructuring in each case, necessitating the capitalization of all expenses
related to the transaction.
As previously discussed in this Note, participants and observers use
the terms "hostile" and "friendly" as subjective labels to describe the
origin and nature of M&A transactions.'76 When irrelevant references to
the presence or absence of hostility are removed, the acquisition
essentially becomes just another capital transaction. As Judge Halpern of
the Tax Court stated:
Neither the investment bankers' fees nor the printing fees related to
current income production or the needs of the immediate present.
Those fees were incurred in connection with a change in ownership
with indefinite and extended future consequences to [Staley]. They
are properly matched against revenues of a taxable period (perhaps
an indefinite taxable period) longer than the taxable year during
which such fees were incurred.
177
If courts assume that the acquirer realizes future benefits from its
acquisition and must capitalize its expenses, then under the same logic,
the target must also capitalize its costs associated with the transaction.
If the target does not successfully consummate the proposed merger or
acquisition, the tax consequences will depend upon what alternative
transaction the target actually adopts. If the target avoids the original
tender offer by successfully merging with a white knight, the fees
incurred to facilitate the white knight transaction must be capitalized. 78
175. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 81-82; Staley, 119 F.3d at 485.
176. See supra Part I.A.
177. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 197-98 (1995), rev'd, 119 F.3d 482.
178. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990). This result should hold true even though at
least one court did allow a loss deduction under § 165 for fees incurred to facilitate a white knight
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The fees associated with any other corporate restructuring or
recapitalization will similarly require capital treatment under INDOPCO.
In short, section 162 has no application to any of the costs surrounding
such transactions unless it can be absolutely shown that no future benefit
will result, a standard that in practice should be nearly impossible for the
taxpayer to meet. In the future, taxpayers, the IRS, and the courts can
avoid this troubling conundrum entirely by shifting the focus of the
analysis to deductibility under section 165.
B. Deductibility Should Be Determined Under Section 165 Alone
Not only is the application of deductibility under section 165 for all
M&A deals one that both the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit can
agree upon, but it also addresses more appropriately the nature of M&A
transactions as a whole. Forcing future taxpayers to frame their
arguments in terms of facilitative and non-facilitative costs instead of
hostile or defensive costs isolates the problem while avoiding messy
subjective inquiries into the parties' actual intent and true motives.
Reinforcing the general rule of capitalization while allowing for the
possibility of limited deductions under section 165 promotes the faithful
application of fundamental tax principles and encourages taxpayers to
structure their fee arrangements based upon an objective assessment of
the various fees involved.
The probable reason for both the Tax Court and Seventh Circuit's
inability to reach this more logical and expedient conclusion stems from
the traditional approach to the capitalization-deduction debate as an all-
or-nothing matter. Following Justice Cardozo's oft-quoted opinion in
Welch v. Helvering,79 litigants have fought in each subsequent case over
whose "answer to the riddle" was more convincing.' The prevailing
merger, because in that case the proposed white knight merger was abandoned in the face of the
successful consummation of the original hostile takeover. See In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 171
B.R 603, 610 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
179. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
180. Id. at 114-15. In numerous subsequent deduction-capitalization disputes, parties inevitably
invoke Justice Cardozo's statement on the difficulty of making the distinction:
Here, indeed, as so often in other branches of the law, the decisive distinctions are those of
degree and not of kind. One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready
touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life. Life
in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle.
Id.
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party either won postponement of all of the tax effects to later years or
had all of the tax effects recognized in the current tax year. This all-or-
nothing approach has come to define the time-worn process of
determining whether costs are more properly viewed as outlays or
expenses.
Loss deductions under section 165, however, should be viewed
separately from this debate. Whereas many of the results in past cases
dealing with the choice between deductibility and capitalization rest
upon troubling distinctions and policy exceptions, 81 loss deductions
under section 165 are generally easier to determine and rarely involve the
puzzling dilemma of deciding whether or not a future benefit exists. Loss
deductions inherently avoid all-or-nothing inquiries and allow the
taxpayer to allocate costs and demonstrate that each claimed deduction
stems from an outlay that does not produce anything of value beyond the
current tax year.
In practice, taxpayers should be required to first itemize their
facilitative costs and designate them for capital treatment, and then
identify the non-facilitative costs and explain precisely how they were
incurred for services related exclusively to abandoned or never
implemented plans for alternative capital transactions. For example, if
the target of a hostile takeover pays investment bankers to investigate
and plan a self-tender whereby the target would attempt to buy back its
own stock in the face of the takeover, the tax consequences would
depend entirely on whether or not the plans formulated were
implemented. If the self-tender succeeds, then the bankers' fees would
require capitalization and the taxpayer would be obligated to designate
these fees as capital outlays on its tax form for the year. If the planned
self-tender failed, however, and the target was eventually acquired by the
hostile bidder, the time and effort spent on the self-tender option will
have resulted in nothing. The costs incurred clearly will not result in any
future benefit or consequence to the entity extending beyond the current
tax year and should logically qualify for a loss deduction in the current
year.
Staley hired the investment bankers to investigate the feasibility of
and formulate plans for a host of alternative capital transactions. The
investment bankers also spent considerable time evaluating the true value
181. See Chirelstein, supra note 14, 6.02, at 120. For example, the IRS generally considers
advertising and related outlays deductible currently even though such expenditures often contribute
to future revenue beyond the current tax year. Id
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of Staley's shares, promoting this value to the market place, pitching
alternative bidders and potential white knights, and generally advising
Staley's board on how to deal with Tate & Lyle. Such services can and
should have been broken down and the costs allocated between those that
proximately facilitated any subsequent capital transactions and those that
did not ultimately facilitate anything lasting beyond the current tax year.
The courts should ensure that taxpayers do so in all future capital
transactions.
V. CONCLUSION
In A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner,"2 the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged the relevance and importance of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner83 but failed to
apply it properly. The court fell into the word trap of M&A jargon,
basing its extension of the business defense rationale of deductibility on
the subjective perceptions of some of the participants and observers of
the deal. Corporate executives from Tokyo to New York will continue to
read up on new age translations of Sun Tzu's The Art of War84 to
improve their acumen in fighting off the "barbarians at the gate."'85
Observers and commentators will persist in their attempts to spice up the
business section of the newspaper with colorful and evocative
terminology. But for purposes of the Tax Code, "hostile" takeovers do
not inherently constitute threats or attacks; they involve simply the
buying and selling of shares in publicly traded corporations.
Accordingly, the defense of business rationale should not apply to the
determination of the proper tax treatment of costs related to such
transactions. Instead, such costs should generally be capitalized with the
limited exception that taxpayers be allowed the opportunity to prove a
right to certain loss deductions for costs properly attributable to
abandoned transactions.
182. 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997).
183. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
184. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1971). This 2400-
year-old Chinese classic on military tactics and strategies was written during the Warring States
Period in China (453-221 B.C.). Numerous competing English translations of the book have been
hot sellers in corporate America since the early 1980s. The book is especially popular with corporate
managers and executives searching for all forms of enlightenment on how to meet the challenges of a
rough-and-tumble corporate world.
185. See Burrough & Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate, supra note 141.
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